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1.
Health Secur ; 19(4): 413-423, 2021.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1338084

ABSTRACT

Field simulation exercises (FSXs) require substantial time, resources, and organizational experience to plan and implement and are less commonly undertaken than drills or tabletop exercises. Despite this, FSXs provide an opportunity to test the full scope of operational capacities, including coordination across sectors. From June 11 to 14, 2019, the East African Community Secretariat conducted a cross-border FSX at the Namanga One Stop Border Post between the Republic of Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania. The World Health Organization Department of Health Security Preparedness was the technical lead responsible for developing and coordinating the exercise. The purpose of the FSX was to assess and further enhance multisectoral outbreak preparedness and response in the East Africa Region, using a One Health approach. Participants included staff from the transport, police and customs, public health, animal health, and food inspection sectors. This was the first FSX of this scale, magnitude, and complexity to be conducted in East Africa for the purpose of strengthening emergency preparedness capacities. The FSX provided an opportunity for individual learning and national capacity strengthening in emergency management and response coordination. In this article, we describe lessons learned and propose recommendations relevant to FSX design, management, and organization to inform future field exercises.


Subject(s)
Civil Defense , Disaster Planning , Africa, Eastern , Disease Outbreaks , Humans , Public Health , World Health Organization
2.
Disaster Med Public Health Prep ; 16(4): 1612-1617, 2022 08.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1149632

ABSTRACT

The United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the World Health Organization broadly categorize mass gathering events as high risk for amplification of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) spread in a community due to the nature of respiratory diseases and the transmission dynamics. However, various measures and modifications can be put in place to limit or reduce the risk of further spread of COVID-19 for the mass gathering. During this pandemic, the Johns Hopkins University Center for Health Security produced a risk assessment and mitigation tool for decision-makers to assess SARS-CoV-2 transmission risks that may arise as organizations and businesses hold mass gatherings or increase business operations: The JHU Operational Toolkit for Businesses Considering Reopening or Expanding Operations in COVID-19 (Toolkit). This article describes the deployment of a data-informed, risk-reduction strategy that protects local communities, preserves local health-care capacity, and supports democratic processes through the safe execution of the Republican National Convention in Charlotte, North Carolina. The successful use of the Toolkit and the lessons learned from this experience are applicable in a wide range of public health settings, including school reopening, expansion of public services, and even resumption of health-care delivery.


Subject(s)
COVID-19 , Humans , COVID-19/epidemiology , COVID-19/prevention & control , SARS-CoV-2 , Pandemics/prevention & control , Risk Assessment , Delivery of Health Care
3.
2020.
Non-conventional in English | Homeland Security Digital Library | ID: grc-740509

ABSTRACT

From the Webpage: This operational toolkit has been developed to help business owners who are considering reopening or expanding their operations to determine their establishments' risk of transmission of COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] and how to reduce it. As displayed in the figure below, the Operational Toolkit consists of 3 parts: an instruction manual;a business risk worksheet;and an assessment calculator.COVID-19 (Disease);Disaster recovery;Disaster recovery--Plans

4.
BMJ Glob Health ; 5(10)2020 10.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-841420

ABSTRACT

Infectious disease outbreaks pose major threats to human health and security. Countries with robust capacities for preventing, detecting and responding to outbreaks can avert many of the social, political, economic and health system costs of such crises. The Global Health Security Index (GHS Index)-the first comprehensive assessment and benchmarking of health security and related capabilities across 195 countries-recently found that no country is sufficiently prepared for epidemics or pandemics. The GHS Index can help health security stakeholders identify areas of weakness, as well as opportunities to collaborate across sectors, collectively strengthen health systems and achieve shared public health goals. Some scholars have recently offered constructive critiques of the GHS Index's approach to scoring and ranking countries; its weighting of select indicators; its emphasis on transparency; its focus on biosecurity and biosafety capacities; and divergence between select country scores and corresponding COVID-19-associated caseloads, morbidity, and mortality. Here, we (1) describe the practical value of the GHS Index; (2) present potential use cases to help policymakers and practitioners maximise the utility of the tool; (3) discuss the importance of scoring and ranking; (4) describe the robust methodology underpinning country scores and ranks; (5) highlight the GHS Index's emphasis on transparency and (6) articulate caveats for users wishing to use GHS Index data in health security research, policymaking and practice.


Subject(s)
Global Health , Security Measures/organization & administration , Benchmarking/organization & administration , Betacoronavirus , COVID-19 , Coronavirus Infections/epidemiology , Coronavirus Infections/mortality , Coronavirus Infections/prevention & control , Humans , Leadership , Pandemics/prevention & control , Pneumonia, Viral/epidemiology , Pneumonia, Viral/mortality , Pneumonia, Viral/prevention & control , SARS-CoV-2
5.
BMJ Glob Health ; 5(6)2020 06.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-603208

ABSTRACT

INTRODUCTION: Nine events have been assessed for potential declaration of a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). A PHEIC is defined as an extraordinary event that constitutes a public health risk to other states through international spread and requires a coordinated international response. The WHO Director-General convenes Emergency Committees (ECs) to provide their advice on whether an event constitutes a PHEIC. The EC rationales have been criticised for being non-transparent and contradictory to the International Health Regulations (IHR). This first comprehensive analysis of EC rationale provides recommendations to increase clarity of EC decisions which will strengthen the IHR and WHO's legitimacy in future outbreaks. METHODS: 66 EC statements were reviewed from nine public health outbreaks of influenza A, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus, polio, Ebola virus disease, Zika, yellow fever and coronavirus disease-2019. Statements were analysed to determine which of the three IHR criteria were noted as contributing towards the EC's justification on whether to declare a PHEIC and what language was used to explain the decision. RESULTS: Interpretation of the criteria were often vague and applied inconsistently. ECs often failed to describe and justify which criteria had been satisfied. DISCUSSION: Guidelines must be developed for the standardised interpretation of IHR core criteria. The ECs must clearly identify and justify which criteria have contributed to their rationale for or against PHEIC declaration. CONCLUSION: Striving for more consistency and transparency in EC justifications would benefit future deliberations and provide more understanding and support for the process.


Subject(s)
Coronavirus Infections , Disaster Planning , Emergencies , International Health Regulations , Pandemics , Pneumonia, Viral , Public Health/legislation & jurisprudence , Betacoronavirus , COVID-19 , Global Health , Humans , International Cooperation , SARS-CoV-2 , Virus Diseases
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